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THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURTS 
AND IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATE OFFICIALS 
E Kayitana* 
The extent of immunity under international law is important for the international 
legal order, and for the maintenance of good relations between states. Failure to 
respect immunity and inviolability under international law is a breach of an 
international obligation, and the responsibility for this lies with the state. A court 
which issues a warrant, or brings proceedings against a person who is inviolable 
and entitled to immunity, is involving the responsibility of the state.1 
1 Introduction 
Existing records on international crimes indicate that it is State officials, and in 
particular senior officials, who often commit international crimes.2 In order to avoid 
the impunity often caused by the failure of States to take action against their own 
officials and other persons acting on their behalf,3 States adopted in 1998 the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the Rome 
Statute). The International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the ICC) was 
given jurisdiction to try persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and, under some conditions, the crime of aggression.4 Most importantly, the 
principle that immunities do not apply to proceedings before international tribunals5 
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1 Franey Immunity 27-28. 
2 Cassese International Criminal Law 307. Also see Werle International Criminal Law 74: "Crimes 
under international law are typically crimes that occur on a large scale and systematic manner 
with the participation of state organs [...]". 
3 Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (hereinafter the Rome 
Statute) para 5. 
4 ICCLR 2002 http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICCLR-Checklist.pdf 3. The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) will have jurisdiction over the crime of "aggression" once at least 30 States Parties 
have ratified or accepted the amendments made by the 1st Review Conference of Rome Statute 
(held in Kampala, Uganda between 31 May and 11 June 2010); and a decision is taken by two-
thirds of States Parties to activate the jurisdiction at any time after 1 January 2017. See in this 
regard ICC Resolution: The Crime of Aggression RC/Res 6 (2010). 
5 The rule that the official position of a State agent, including an incumbent head of State, is not a 
bar to his prosecution before an international criminal tribunal is clearly established in the 
jurisprudence of various international criminal tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indicted, 
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was reaffirmed in this Statute. In this regard, article 27 of the Rome Statute provides 
as follows: 
1. [T]his Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a 
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government 
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 
The above provision is a significant tool the ICC was equipped with in order for it to 
be able to effectively fight against the culture of impunity that has plagued the world 
in the past. It ensures that persons who commit certain gross human rights 
violations may, whatever their status in their countries, be brought to trial and be 
punished for those acts. 
Nevertheless, under the so-called "complementarity" regime of the Rome Statute, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is secondary to the jurisdiction of domestic courts.6 States 
Parties, not the ICC, have the primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes. The ICC acts only when States are "unable or unwilling" to 
prosecute.7 Under this regime, the Rome Statute gives priority to any willing and 
                                                                                                                                       
respectively, Slobodan Milosevic (The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic Milan Milutinovic, Nikola 
Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojiljkovic Decision on Review of Indictment and 
Application for Consequential Orders ICTY IT-05-87-PT (24 May 1999)) and Charles Taylor 
(Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-
Disclosure SCSL-2003-01-I (7 March 2003)) when they were still serving as heads of State. This 
rule was reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 Judgement 2002 ICJ 3 (14 
February 2002) para 61), stating that: "[A]n incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs 
may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they 
have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations and the future International Criminal Court 
created by the 1998 Rome Convention".  
6 Van Sliedregt and Stoitchkova "International Criminal Law" 257. 
7 To this end, art 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that a case shall be inadmissible before 
the ICC where "[T]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution". It further provides that a case shall be inadmissible before the ICC if it "has been 
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute 
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
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able State, without requiring any particular link to the crime, including States 
exercising universal jurisdiction.8 As a State Party, in order to give effect to the 
complementarity regime of the Rome Statute, South Africa enacted the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002 (hereafter the Implementation Act) which determines the modalities of 
prosecuting perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (hereafter referred to as international crimes) in South African courts.  
The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction 
over these crimes not only when they are committed on the territory of South Africa 
but also when they are committed outside the Republic.9 By granting South African 
courts jurisdiction over a person who commits a crime outside the Republic when 
that person is later found on South African territory,10 without regard to that 
person's nationality or the nationality of the victims, the Implementation Act 
empowers South African courts with universal jurisdiction over international crimes.  
                                                                                                                                       
State genuinely to prosecute" (art 17(1)(b) Rome Statute). With regard to completed trials, the 
Rome Statute also provides that the ICC may not hear such cases if the person concerned has 
already been tried for the same conduct by a national court (art 20(2) Rome Statute), unless the 
national proceedings: "[W]ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or [o]therwise were not conducted 
independently or impartially in accordance with norms of due process recognized by international 
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice". Art 20(3) Rome Statute. 
8 Burke-White 2003 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 203; Stigen Principle of Complementarity 477. Also see 
Demeyele, Verhoeven and Wouters "International Criminal Court's Office of the Prosecutor" 364. 
9 Section 4(3) of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002 (hereinafter the Implementation Act) provides as follows: 
"[...] any person who commits a crime contemplated in subsection (I) outside the 
territory of the Republic, is deemed to have committed that crime in the territory of 
the Republic if- 
that person is a South African citizen; or 
that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the Republic;  
that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of 
Republic; or 
that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or against 
a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic." 
10 Section 4(3)(c) Implementation Act. 
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This article seeks to determine whether and to what extent foreign State officials, 
such as foreign heads of State, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs, 
can plead immunity when they are accused of international crimes before South 
African courts when exercising their universal jurisdiction in terms of the 
Implementation Act and in accordance with the complementarity regime of the 
Rome Statute. In other words, this paper endeavours to determine whether 
international law rules regarding immunities of State officials may or may not limit 
the ability of South African courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed in foreign States.  
The article is based on the assumption that since, under the principle of 
complementarity, South African courts are required to try crimes which would 
otherwise have to be tried by the ICC, South African courts should have the same 
powers as those that States Parties gave to the ICC in order to allow it to effectively 
carry out its mandate. It is also assumed, however, that since the ICC is an 
international criminal tribunal, it may have some powers that international law does 
not grant to domestic courts. Hence the following question: do South African courts 
have the same powers, as the ICC has, to disregard the immunities of foreign State 
officials which, under international customary law, attach to their functions or 
status? 
Section 4(2)(a) of the Implementation Act provides that:  
[D]espite any other law to the contrary, including customary and conventional 
international law, the fact that a person-  
(a)  is or was a head of State or government, a member of a government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official [...], is neither-  
(i)  a defence to a crime; nor 
(ii)  a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been 
convicted of a crime.11 
Most of the South African scholars who have commented on the Implementation Act 
have interpreted this provision as removing whatever immunity (both functional and 
                                            
11 Section 4(2) Implementation Act. 
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personal) foreign officials may have before South African courts.12 Dugard and 
Abraham13 argue that section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act represents a 
choice by the legislature not to follow the "unfortunate" Arrest Warrant decision, "of 
which it must have been aware". It would be ridiculous, they say, to allow a foreign 
head of State or government responsible for committing international crimes in his 
own country to plead immunity before a South African court "when he could not do 
so before the ICC".14 In support of this view, Du Plessis15 says: 
In terms of the Act, South African courts, acting under the complementarity 
scheme, are accorded the same power to "trump" the immunities which usually 
attach to officials of government as the ICC is by virtue of Article 27 of the Statute. 
The above interpretation has also received judicial endorsement in Southern African 
Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions16 where Fabricius J said:  
It must not be forgotten that the ICC Act itself denies explicitly diplomatic immunity 
to government officials accused of committing ICC Act crimes. (See s 4(2) (a)). The 
recent trial of Taylor, in the International Criminal Court in The Hague, is a case in 
point.17 
                                            
12 Du Plessis 2003 SACJ 6; Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 166; and Chok 2013 
http://works.bepress.com/brian_chok/1/ 14. Also see Kemp et al Criminal Law 102: "This is a 
significant and progressive provision, which is in line with the aim of international criminal law to 
end impunity for the serious crimes under international law. In practical terms, this means that a 
foreign government official or head of state, suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or genocide (anywhere in the world) can, upon arrival in South Africa, be 
arrested and tried in a South African criminal court for these crimes". 
13 Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 166. Also see Du Plessis "International Criminal 
Courts" 211, where the author says that in terms of s 4(2)(a) of the Implementation Act, South 
African courts are "accorded the same power to 'trump' the immunities which usually attach to 
officials of government as the International Criminal Court is by virtue of article 27 of the Rome 
Statute".  
14 Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 166. 
15 Du Plessis 2007 JICJ 15. For a similar view, see Chok 2013 
http://works.bepress.com/brian_chok/1/ 14: "[in] South Africa, head of state immunity can no 
longer serve as a bar to prosecution against foreign state officials regarding allegations of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes." 
16 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 JDR 0822 
(GNP). 
17 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 JDR 0822 
(GNP) 129. It must be noted that in the Taylor case referred to by Fabricius J, the accused, 
Charles Taylor, was prosecuted before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, not the ICC as 
mentioned by Fabricius J. It is also important to note that the Special Court for Sierra Leone is 
an international criminal tribunal, while the Implementation Act deals with the prosecution of 
international crimes in South African courts. 
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This article challenges this interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation 
Act. The present author argues that the Implementation Act must be interpreted as 
not addressing the question of the immunities of foreign State officials, both 
functional and personal. In the light of this interpretation, the article goes on to 
determine which law must be applied should a case involving the immunities of 
foreign State officials be brought before a South African court. In order to give a 
proper background to this discussion, it is necessary to first peruse the international 
law norms that govern this important aspect of international relations. 
2 Immunities of State officials under international law 
Under customary international law, two types of immunity may apply to State 
individual officials. First, there is immunity ratione materiae, which applies to acts 
performed in an official capacity.18 This immunity is often referred to as subject-
matter immunity or functional immunity and continues to apply even once the official 
has left office.19 On the other hand, immunity ratione personae, or personal 
immunity, attaches to a limited category of officials by virtue of their particular role 
in representing the State abroad, for example heads of State or heads of 
government, ministers of foreign affairs and diplomats.20 
For both types of immunity, the purpose is not to benefit the individual, but to 
protect official acts (functional immunity) or to facilitate international relations 
(personal immunity). It is the State which is the real beneficiary of the immunity 
and, for this reason, the State may waive21 it, irrespective of the wishes of the 
person claiming the immunity.22 
                                            
18 Dugard International Law 253. 
19 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 827; Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 390; Markovich 2009 Potentia 
59; and Cryer et al International Criminal Law 534. 
20 Redress 2005 http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Immunity_v_Accountability.pdf 9. 
21 A waiver is the permission given by a State whose official enjoys immunity ratione personae, 
authorising the State with enforcement jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, arrest and 
trial of the official concerned. Yitiha Immunity 136. Also see ILC Documents of the Thirty-first 
Session (Excluding the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.l (1979) 240: "It is often stated that consent of States is the basis of 
international obligation and the foundation of jurisdiction for international settlement of disputes 
as well as for the exercise of foreign territorial jurisdiction. It is in the ultimate analysis the 
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The legal regime of immunities of State officials may seem complex.23 However, if 
one keeps in mind the above-mentioned distinctions and the underlying rationales of 
the two types of immunities, one will find that a fairly consistent and coherent set of 
rules exists. 
2.1 Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity 
Also known as functional immunity, immunity ratione materiae relates to conduct 
carried out on behalf of a State.24 The rationale for this type of immunity is that 
actions against State agents in respect of their official acts are essentially 
proceedings against the State they represent.25 As a British court once said:26 
[A] foreign sovereign government [...] can only act through agents, and the 
immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory unless it 
extended also to its agents in respect of acts done by them on its behalf.27 
Functional immunity is grounded in the view that if one State would adjudicate upon 
the conduct of another State through proceeding against the official who carried out 
the act, that would conflict with the principle of state equality.28 It thus prevents a 
                                                                                                                                       
source of the binding force of rules of international law. Consent is therefore an important 
element in the doctrine of State immunity. Once consent is given by the State entitled to 
immunity, the territorial authorities can exercise their normal jurisdiction". 
22 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 534 and Bassiouni International Criminal Law 62-63. For a 
contrary view see Kemp et al Criminal Law 579, where the authors argue that immunity ratione 
materiae belongs to the individual, not the State and that, accordingly, this immunity cannot be 
waived by the State to which the official belongs. It is submitted that this view is not correct as it 
confuses the procedural defence of immunity ratione materiae with the substantive defence of 
"official capacity". While the latter belongs to the individual official, the former belongs to the 
State on behalf of which the individual performed the act that forms the basis of the litigation. 
See 3.2 hereunder. 
23 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 533. 
24 Kemp et al Criminal Law 579. 
25 See Stewart 2011 Vanderbilt J Transnat'l L 1056. 
26 Zoernsch v Waldock 1964 1 WLR 675 692. For a similar statement by a court see Chuidian v 
Philippine National Bank 912 F 2d 1095 1101 (29 August 1990): "it is generally recognized that a 
suit against an individual acting in his official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against 
the sovereign directly". 
27 Also see Cryer et al International Criminal Law 533: "If a State could bring criminal proceedings 
against the individual officials who carried out official functions of another State, the State would 
be doing indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely, acting as the arbiter of the conduct of 
another State". 
28 Knushel 2011 JIHR 150 and Franey Immunity 16. Also see Cryer et al International Criminal Law 
533: "Functional immunity protects conduct carried out on behalf of a State. It is linked to the 
maxim that a State may not sit in judgment on the policies and actions of another State, since 
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State's courts from indirectly exercising jurisdiction over acts of foreign States 
through instituting proceedings against State officials who carry out States' 
activities.29 In other words, immunity ratione materiae functions as a jurisdictional or 
procedural defence by preventing the circumvention of the immunity of a State 
through proceedings brought against officials acting on its behalf.30 
In so doing, some commentators have argued,31 functional immunity serves at the 
same time as a "substantive defence"32 for the State official by ensuring that the 
individual official "cannot"33 be legally held responsible for acts that are in fact the 
acts of the State on whose behalf the official acted. It is submitted that this view is 
not correct. Immunity ratione materiae does not function as a substantive defence 
but only as a jurisdiction defence. This is so, because this immunity (just like 
immunity ratione personae, which will be discussed later in this article) belongs to 
the State, not the individual and, for this reason, can be waived by the State on 
behalf of which the individual acted, irrespective of the wishes of the official claiming 
the immunity.34 Thus, the existence of functional (and personal) immunity does not 
mean that there is a lack of "substantive legal responsibility", but rather that a 
foreign State is "procedurally" prevented from bringing proceedings against the 
individual perpetrator.35 If the State chooses to waive his immunity, the official 
cannot claim immunity himself.36 
                                                                                                                                       
they are both sovereign and equal". 
29 Akande 2004 AJIL 427. Also see ILC Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur UN Doc A/CN 4/631 
(2010) 58. 
30 Bantekas and Nash International Criminal Law 168; Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 827; 
Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 403 and Foakes 2011 http://www.chathamhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/bp1111_foakes.pdf 8: "The main effect 
of such immunity is to prevent litigants from seeking to circumvent the rules on state immunity 
by taking action against the individuals carrying out the business of the state". 
31 Swanepoel 2007 JJS 127 and Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 826. 
32 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 826. Also see Cassese 2002 EJIL 863 and Bantekas and Nash 
International Criminal Law 168. 
33 Swanepoel 2007 JJS 127. Also see Zappalà 2001 EJIL 155: "The consequence is that a public 
official cannot be held accountable for acts performed in the exercise of an official capacity, as 
these are to be referred to the State itself". 
34 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 534. 
35 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 534. 
36 Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 406: "None of the immunities which have been considered are for 
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Immunity ratione materiae is enjoyed by all foreign officials regardless of rank.37 It 
may also be relied on by serving State officials as well as by former officials in 
respect of official acts performed while in office.38 This is also not affected by the 
purpose of an official's presence in the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction. 
Irrespective of whether this person is abroad on an official visit or is staying there in 
a private capacity, he enjoys immunity from that State's courts in respect of acts 
performed in his official capacity in his home State.39 
However, a survey of the literature and the decisions of national courts reveals that 
immunity ratione materiae applies only in civil cases. It does not apply before the 
criminal courts of foreign States which have jurisdiction over a crime.40 Furthermore, 
State practice reveals that these crimes include not only those committed against a 
direct interest or citizen of the forum State41 but also international crimes with no 
substantial link with the prosecuting State.42 
A well-known case where State officials were prosecuted for acts committed on 
behalf of the State is the so-called Lockerbie case.43 In this case, two members of 
the Libyan Intelligence Service were prosecuted for offences of terrorism which had 
been committed on behalf of the State of Libya. On 21 December 1988 Pan Am 
Flight 103 was en route from London to New York when it exploded in mid-air over 
                                                                                                                                       
the benefit of any particular individual or group of individuals, but rather are for the benefit of 
the State … which they represent. Thus the sending State […] can waive any of these 
immunities, thereby consenting to the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State over the 
official in question. This applies whether the immunity in question is granted ratione personae or 
ratione materiae". 
37 Knushel 2011 JIHR 151 and ILC Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur UN Doc A/CN 4/631 
(2010) 59. 
38 Kemp et al Criminal Law 579; Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 827; Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 
390 and Markovich 2009 Potentia 59. Also see Cryer et al International Criminal Law 534: 
"[f]unctional immunity protects only conduct carried out in the course of the individual's duties, 
but does not drop away when a person's role comes to an end, since it protects the conduct, not 
the person". 
39 ILC Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by Roman 
Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur UN Doc A/CN 4/631 (2010) 58. 
40 See Kayitana Jurisdictional Problems 100-114. 
41 See Kayitana Jurisdictional Problems 100-104. 
42 See Kayitana Jurisdictional Problems 104-114. 
43 Her Majesty's Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhima The High 
Court of Justiciary Case No 1475/99 (30 January 2001). 
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the village of Lockerbie in Scotland. Hundreds of people were killed. The 
investigation established that a bomb contained in a radio-cassette player had been 
detonated automatically and had caused the explosion.44 
On 13 November 1991 warrants were issued for the arrest of two Libyans, 
Abdelbasset al-Megrahi and Ali Fhimah, on charges of conspiracy to murder, murder 
and breaches of the UK Aircraft Security Act 1982. The charges alleged that the 
conspiracy to blow up the aircraft and the actions performed in furtherance of that 
conspiracy were Libyan State policy and officially sanctioned. Investigations 
established that the two defendants committed the crimes as members of the Libyan 
Intelligence Services, and that their acts were official actions performed by State 
officials in the execution of State policy.45 
The issue of immunity did not arise at all. The US and UK requested Libya to 
extradite the two suspects,46 and the UN Security Council supported this request, 
saying that it was: 
Deeply concerned over the results of investigations, which implicate officials of the 
Libyan Government and […] Recalling the statement made on 30 December 1988 
by the President of the Council on behalf of the members of the Council strongly 
condemning the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 and calling on all States to assist 
in the apprehension and prosecution of those responsible for this criminal act.47 
More significantly, Libya could have claimed that neither the British nor the American 
courts had jurisdiction, on the basis that the allegations concerned actions of a 
sovereign State, which were immune from the jurisdiction of foreign States. But 
Libya did not do so. Instead it said that it would consider trying the men itself.48 
After years of negotiations a Scottish Court was convened in The Netherlands. At no 
stage in these proceedings did Libya assert that the court did not have jurisdiction to 
try the allegations because of State immunity and neither of the defendants raised 
as a defence that the actions alleged were the actions of the Libyan State, and that 
                                            
44 Franey Immunity 208. 
45 Franey Immunity 208. 
46 Franey Immunity 208. 
47 Paras 5 and 6 UN SC Resolution on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya UN Doc S/RES/731 (1992). 
48 Franey Immunity 208-209. 
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they were therefore entitled to be acquitted. On 31 January 2001 the court 
convicted Mr al-Megrahi of murder.49 
The Lockerbie case is thus a clear example of a State agent's being accused and 
convicted of committing crimes on the orders of his State, and being held liable as 
an individual for the criminal conduct.50 
With regard to international crimes in particular, the characterisation of such conduct 
as crimes under international law absolves them from the protection of immunity 
ratione materiae.51 This immunity is justified on three grounds, of which none can 
apply to international crimes. First, immunity ratione materiae is based on the view 
that all States are equal, and for one State to judge the sovereign actions of another 
State would be an unacceptable act of interference by that State in the affairs of the 
other State.52 Given the egregious nature of international crimes, however, these 
crimes cannot be considered as an internal matter of any country. These crimes are 
considered as being committed against the international community as a whole and 
as being subject to the universal jurisdiction of all States.53 
Secondly, immunity ratione materiae is justified as necessary to protect States' 
dignity in that it prevents a foreign State from judging another State's conduct.54 
Nevertheless, since international crimes are prohibited by international law, 
prosecuting State officials who committed international crimes would not offend the 
dignity of the State on behalf of which they acted. Dignity would rather require 
States to refrain from engaging in such activities.55 
                                            
49 Her Majesty's Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhima The High 
Court of Justiciary Case No 1475/99 (30 January 2001) para 89. The second accused, Mr Fhima, 
was found not guilty and released. See para 85 of the same judgment. 
50 Franey Immunity 210. 
51 Also see Beanchi 1999 EJIL 265; Wirth 2002 EJIL 888 and Dugard International Law 253: "[s]uch 
immunity [rationemateriae] does not exist when a person is charged with an international crime 
either because such acts can never be 'official' or because they violate norms of jus cogens and 
such peremptory norms prevail over immunity". 
52 Franey Immunity 195 and Kemp et al Criminal Law 579. 
53 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 542-543. Also see Henrard 1999 MSU-DCL J Int'l L 612. 
54 Wirth 2002 EJIL 888. 
55 Wirth 2002 EJIL 888. Also see Cryer et al International Criminal Law 542: "[f]unctional immunity 
protects State conduct from scrutiny, but it would be incongruous for international law to protect 
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Thirdly, this type of immunity is justified as necessary to enable State officials to 
perform their functions without fear of subsequent prosecution.56 This justification 
does not stand either. Far from being a function of a State, the perpetration of 
international crimes is the opposite of any of the State's functions. States must 
protect their citizens, not kill them or otherwise seriously violate their rights to the 
extent prohibited by international law.57 State officials who commit international 
crimes are thus rightly held personally accountable by the courts of foreign States.58 
As the House of Lords said in the Pinochet case: 
... international law has made plain that certain types of conduct [...] are not 
acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. That applies as much to heads of State, 
or even more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a 
mockery of international law.59 
From the perspective of the perpetrator, the removal of immunity ratione materiae 
in case of serious crimes under international law is also justified because in this area 
"individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of 
obedience".60 He who commits a serious crime under international law cannot obtain 
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State because the State in 
authorising action "moves outside its competence under International Law".61 
                                                                                                                                       
the very conduct which it criminalizes and for which it imposes duties to prosecute". 
56 Franey Immunity 195. 
57 Franey Immunity 195. Also see UN ESC Study on Amnesty Laws and their Role in the Safeguard 
and Promotion of Human Rights: Preliminary Report by Mr Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur UN 
Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1985/16 (1985) 17.  
58 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 543. Also see Murungu Immunity of State Officials 91. 
59 R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 1998 4 All ER 897 939-940. As a 
result of the ruling by the House of Lords, the Home Secretary authorised extradition, but then 
the House of Lords set aside its first decision because one of the judges, Lord Hoffman, had 
failed to disclose that his wife was an unpaid director of Amnesty International, which had been 
involved in a campaign against the applicant and had been a party in the proceedings, and that 
could infer either bias or a possible conflict of interest (R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) 1999 1 All ER 577). In the third judgment of the 
House of Lords (R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) 1999 2 All ER 97), the first judgment was confirmed. The Court found that: "If Senator 
Pinochet behaved as Spain alleged, then the entirety of his conduct was a violation of the norms 
of international law. He can have no immunity against prosecution for any crime that formed 
part of that campaign". R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No 3) 1999 2 All ER 97 190. 
60 Trial of the German Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Vol I 
(Nuremberg 1947) 56. 
61 Trial of the German Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Vol I 
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In the light of the above considerations, it is concluded that under customary 
international law, State officials do not enjoy immunity ratione materiae from the 
jurisdiction of foreign States, when they are accused of international crimes.62 It 
follows from this conclusion that by denying this immunity in possible future cases, 
South African courts would not violate any of South Africa's obligation under 
international law. In the next section, the position of international law regarding the 
question of immunity ratione personae of current State officials, such as sitting 
heads of State and heads of government, will be considered. 
2.2 Immunity ratione personae or personal immunity 
2.2.1. Definition 
International relations and international cooperation between States require an 
effective process of communication between States' representatives.63 Accordingly, 
international law confers immunities on certain State officials in order to enable them 
to negotiate with one another freely and without harassment by other States.64 This 
immunity is described as immunity ratione personae or personal immunity.65 
In contrast to functional immunity, personal immunity is absolute.66 It provides 
complete immunity of the person of certain office holders while they carry out 
representative functions.67 It prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction not only in cases 
involving the acts of these individuals in their official capacity but also in cases 
involving private acts.68 It also applies whether or not the act in question was carried 
                                                                                                                                       
(Nuremberg 1947) 56. 
62 Also see ILC 2009 http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf art 
III(1): "No immunity from jurisdiction other than personal immunity in accordance with 
international law applies with regard to international crimes". 
63 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 818. 
64 Tunks 2002 Duke LJ 657 and Knushel 2011 JIHR 151. 
65 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 818. 
66 Gevers 2011 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975788&download=yes 3. 
67 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 533. 
68 Kemp et al Criminal Law 579; Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 819 and Knushel 2011 JIHR 151. Also 
see Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 389: "These immunities are often wide enough to cover both 
the official and the private acts of such office-holders, since interference with the performance of 
the official functions of such a person can result from the subjection of either type of act to the 
jurisdiction of the receiving State (e.g., if a diplomat is arrested he is unlikely to be able to 
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out at a time when the official was in office or before entry to office.69 Conversely, 
since this type of immunity is connected with the position occupied by the official in 
government service, it is of a temporary character and ceases when he or she leaves 
that post.70 
A criminal case where this type of immunity was considered and recognised is the 
Gaddafi case,71 which arose before the French Court of Cassation. In this case, it 
was held that the Libyan Head of State enjoyed immunity ratione personae in 
criminal proceedings for acts of international terrorism leading to murder and the 
destruction of an aircraft.72 The Court held that international customary law does not 
allow that sitting heads of State be the subject of proceedings before criminal 
tribunals of a foreign State and accordingly quashed the proceedings against the 
Libyan leader.73 Whether this immunity also applies in cases involving allegations of 
international crimes will be the subject of the heading below. 
2.2.2. Immunity ratione personae and international crimes 
Some commentators have argued that the granting of immunity ratione personae to 
State officials from criminal proceedings arising out of international crimes would be 
"artificial, unjust, and archaic".74 It has also been said that such immunity would 
conflict with the jus cogens status of rules of international law prohibiting such 
crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.75 
                                                                                                                                       
perform his official functions whatever the reason for his arrest)". 
69 Arrest Warrant case paras 54-55. 
70 Markovich 2009 Potentia 59; Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 390; Kemp et al Criminal Law 579 
and Bantekas and Nash International Criminal Law 169. 
71 Gaddafi Court of Appeal of Paris 20 Oct 2000; Court of Cassation 13 March 2001 2004 125 ILR 
490. The case originated from the bombing of a plane (DC 10) of the UTA airlines on 19 
September 1989, in which 156 passengers and 15 members of crew, including French citizens 
were killed. For further details on the case, see Zappalà 2001 EJIL 151 and Markovich 2009 
Potentia 64. 
72 Gaddafi Court of Appeal of Paris 20 Oct 2000; Court of Cassation 13 March 2001 2004 125 ILR 
490 509. 
73 Gaddafi Court of Appeal of Paris 20 Oct 2000; Court of Cassation 13 March 2001 2004 125 ILR 
490 510. 
74 Knuchel 2011 JIHR 149. 
75 See for example, Bassiouni 1996 LCP 63. 
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However, State practice indicates that personal immunity is respected "regardless of 
the nature of the charges".76 As Akande77observes, judicial opinion and State 
practice on this point are unanimous. No case exists thus far in which it was held 
that a State official who would ordinarily enjoy immunity ratione personae can be 
subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign State on the ground that he is 
accused of an international crime.78 This view has also been confirmed by the ICJ in 
a case brought by the DRC against Belgium in respect of a dispute concerning an 
international arrest warrant issued by a Belgian investigation judge against Mr 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, then the foreign minister of the DRC. The warrant was 
issued pursuant to Belgium's 1993 statute concerning the punishment of grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law.79 Yerodia was accused of inciting 
(through his speeches) racial hatred against the Tutsi population in the DRC, 
resulting in several hundred deaths and summary executions, arbitrary arrests, 
lynchings, and unfair trials.80 
The DRC argued that Belgium had violated its right to conduct its foreign relations 
through being appropriately represented by its foreign minister.81 The ICJ held that 
the absolute nature of the immunity from criminal proceedings in a foreign State 
accorded to a serving Foreign Minister ratione personae subsists even when it is 
alleged that he has committed a crime under international law.82 Accordingly, the ICJ 
ruled that foreign ministers (and other high-ranking officials such as the Head of 
State or Head of Government) have immunity from prosecution in foreign national 
                                            
76 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 545. Also see Kemp et al Criminal Law 587 and Bassiouni 
2001 Va J Int'l L 84. 
77 Akande 2004 AJIL 411. 
78 Akande 2004 AJIL 411. 
79 Law of 16 June 1993 Relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 and their Protocol I and II of 8 June 1977 (Belgian Official Journal of 5 August 
1993) 
80 Orakhelashvili 2002 AJIL 677. 
81 Arrest Warrant case paras 42-43. 
82 Arrest Warrant case para 55. Also see Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 401. 
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courts while in office for official actions83 and ordered Belgium to cancel the arrest 
warrant.84 
The ICJ emphasised that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must 
be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities, as 
jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity.85 It stated that although all States 
have (universal) jurisdiction over a range of international crimes, "extension of 
jurisdiction" in no way affects immunities under customary international law. The 
Court held that personal immunity remains opposable before the courts of foreign 
States, even in cases involving the crimes over which universal jurisdiction applies.86 
The ICJ thus affirmed that customary international law precluded national courts 
from trying high-ranking officials of foreign States, including ministers of foreign 
affairs, who are required to travel abroad in the performance of their official duties.87 
Some scholars have expressed opposition to the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant 
case. Dugard88 has described this decision as "controversial, and short-sighted". In 
particular, Dugard89 argues that: 
... it would be ridiculous to allow a foreign head of state or government responsible 
for committing genocide in his own country successfully to plead immunity before a 
South African court when he could not do so before the ICC. 
It is submitted that the above argument is not correct because it overlooks the 
fundamental rationale behind immunity ratione personae. This immunity is necessary 
for the maintenance of a system of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among 
States. Without the guarantee that States' representatives will not be subjected to 
trial in foreign courts, they may simply choose to stay at home rather than to run 
the risks of engaging in international diplomacy.90 As Yitiha91 notes, the "lack of 
                                            
83 Arrest Warrant case para 78 (2). 
84 Arrest Warrant case para 78 (3). 
85 Arrest Warrant case para 59 
86 Arrest Warrant case para 59. 
87 Arrest Warrant case para 58. Also see Aust Handbook 161 and Cassese 2003 JICJ 594. 
88 Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 165. 
89 Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 166. 
90 Tunks 2002 Duke LJ 656. 
91 Yitiha Immunity 136. 
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mobility" of such persons due to fear of arrest would seriously infringe upon the 
functioning of States. In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ inferred from this rationale 
of immunity ratione personae that any prejudice to the effective performance by 
State high-ranking officials of their duties as representatives of their States must be 
prevented.92 
Immunity ratione personae also helps to avoid abuses and imprudent misuses of 
criminal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction can cause disruptions in world order when 
used in a politically motivated manner or for vexatious purposes.93 Also, even with 
the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction can be used imprudently, and that could 
lead to friction between States if the targeted persons are high-ranking officials of a 
State. Thus, as Bassiouni says, without immunity ratione personae, universal 
jurisdiction may become a "wildfire" and "destructive of the international legal 
processes".94 Immunity ratione personae of State officials is thus also mandated by 
the requirements of friendly foreign relations as enshrined in the UN Charter95 and, 
accordingly, in order to maintain good relations between States and preserve 
international peace, immunity ratione personae in domestic courts must prevail even 
over the very important value which is addressed by criminal prosecution of 
international crimes, namely the protection and vindication of human rights.96 
Now that the international law's position on the issue of immunities of State officials 
from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts has been made clear, the next 
discussion will focus on the provisions of South African laws relating to the question 
                                            
92 Swanepoel 2007 JJS 134. Also see Wickremasinghe "Immunities" 409: "The reason for this is 
that the functions which these officials serve in maintaining international relations are such that 
they should not be endangered by the subjection of such officials (whilst they are in office) to 
the criminal jurisdiction of another State". 
93 Bassiouni 2001 Va J Int'l L 82 and Macedo et al 2001 http://lapa.princeton.edu/ 
hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf 24-25. See also Cryer et al International Criminal Law 546: "Its 
[immunity ratione personae's] purpose is to preclude any pretext for interference with a State 
representative, in order to allow international relations between potentially distrustful States". 
Also see Colangelo 2005 Va J Int'l L 3: [universal jurisdiction has been decried as ] "a 
dangerously pliable tool for hostile states to damage international relations by initiating 
unfounded proceedings against each other's officials and citizens". See further HRW 2009 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction. 
94 Bassiouni 2001 Va J Int'l L 154. Also see Zappalà 2001 EJIL 167. 
95 Article 1(2) Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
96 Wirth 2002 EJIL 888. 
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of immunities, both functional and personal, of foreign State officials accused of 
international crimes in South African courts. 
3 Immunities of foreign State officials under South African law 
3.1 The provision of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act 
Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act provides, without any express and 
specific reference to either functional or personal immunity, that: 
[..] the fact that a person-  
(a) is or was a head of State or government, a member of a government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official [...], is neither-  
(i) a defence to a crime; nor 
(ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been  
convicted of a crime. 
As stated above,97 a number of commentators have interpreted the above provision 
as removing both functional and personal immunity in respect of the prosecution of 
international crimes before South African courts.98 Du Plessis99 argues that 
"notwithstanding the contrary position under customary international law", immunity 
ratione personae does not apply in South African courts in case of international 
crimes. He argues that under section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act, South 
African courts are "accorded the same powers (as the ICC) to 'trump'" any 
immunities which "usually attach to officials of government".100 Thus, he says, 
because the customary rules according immunity ratione personae are contrary to an 
Act of Parliament (the Implementation Act), Du Plessis concludes that, in accordance 
                                            
97 See para 1 above. 
98 Du Plessis "International Criminal Courts" 211; Dugard and Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 165-
166; Chok 2013 http://works.bepress.com/brian_chok/1/ 14 and Kemp et al Criminal Law 102. 
Also see Du Plessis 2007 JICJ 470 and Dugard International Law 257. 
99 Du Plessis "International Criminal Courts" 211. Also see Du Plessis 2007 JICJ 470; Dugard and 
Abraham 2002 Annual Survey 165-66 and Chok 2013 http://works.bepress.com/brian_chok/1/ 
14. 
100 Du Plessis "International Criminal Courts" 211 
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with the provisions of section 232 of the Constitution,101 such rules are not 
applicable in South Africa.  
As will become clear in the discussion which follows, Du Plessis's argument is based 
on a wrong interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act. In the 
view of the present writer, by employing the words "defence to a crime", the 
Implementation Act removes only the defence of "official capacity", not immunity, 
whether functional or personal. This is the interpretation of this section which is 
consistent with a grammatical102 approach to statutory interpretation. This argument 
is elaborated upon below. 
3.2 The concept of "defence to a crime" 
The words "defence to a crime" are found in various treatises on South African 
criminal law. Snyman103 states that "every crime has different definitional elements" 
and that "defences" are "based upon the absence of a particular element", for 
example "premises" in housebreaking, "property" in theft, or "judicial proceedings" 
in perjury. Burchell104 identifies three general elements of criminal liability as follows: 
[F]or criminal liability to result, the prosecution (the State) must prove, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the accused has committed, (i) a voluntary act which is 
unlawful (sometimes referred to as actus reus) and that this conduct was 
accompanied by (ii) criminal capacity and (iii) fault (sometimes referred to as mens 
rea).105 
Burchell106 then goes to say, like Snyman, that: 
[S]outh African criminal law distinguishes between defences to criminal liability on 
the basis of the element of criminal liability that is excluded by the defence ie 
defences excluding the unlawfulness of the conduct (ie grounds of justification); 
                                            
101 Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) provides 
that "customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament". 
102 Grammatical interpretation tries to find the meaning of a statute from the language of the text. 
It is the use of the literal meaning of the statutory text. Woolman et al Constitutional Law 32-
160. 
103 Snyman Criminal Law 553. 
104 Burchell Criminal Law and Procedure 45. 
105 Burchell Criminal Law and Procedure 45. 
106 Burchell Criminal Law and Procedure 47. 
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defences excluding capacity and defences and putative defences excluding 
intention. 
It follows from the above that to interpret the words "defence to a crime" contained 
in section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act as referring both to the jurisdictional 
defences of immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae is a 
misunderstanding of these concepts as they are ordinarily used in criminal law. 
Immunities (both functional and personal) do not constitute a "defence to a crime"; 
they prohibit "the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" altogether.107 These immunities 
act as "procedural" bars to "prosecution"108 rather than a "defence to a crime" which 
can be raised only in the course of the trial once the jurisdictional bar has been 
lifted. Thus, the only way that the official status of the accused can be pleaded as a 
"defence to a crime" is when the accused pleads the defence of "official capacity", ie 
that the act that would otherwise be unlawful is justified if the accused is entitled to 
perform it by virtue of the office he occupies.109 For example, a police officer who 
searches a suspected criminal is not guilty of assault or crimen iniuria.110 Likewise, a 
police officer who kills a suspected criminal in the course of effecting a lawful arrest 
is not guilty of murder if certain conditions provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 are met.111 This defence is known as "official capacity"112 or "public 
authority".113 
                                            
107 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 819. 
108 Coracini "Evaluating Domestic Legislation" 729. 
109 Snyman Criminal Law 129. 
110 Snyman Criminal Law 130. 
111 Kemp et al Criminal Law 104-105 and Snyman Criminal Law 130-131. The justification of using 
deadly force in effecting a lawful arrest is governed by s 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. In terms of this section, lethal force may be used if: 
 "(i) The arrestor is attempting to arrest the suspect (not merely to search or question him), and  
 (ii) Lethal force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the arrestor, any person 
lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm; or 
 (iii) There is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or 
 (iv) The offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of forcible and serious nature 
and involves the use of life threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause grievous 
bodily harm." 
112 Snyman Criminal Law 129. 
113 Kemp et al Criminal Law 101. 
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Thus, according to the defence of official capacity (or public authority), State officials 
acting in the performance of their duties may commit acts that are "prima facie 
unlawful"114 but are not liable for those acts because those acts are "justified".115 
This is not a procedural defence but a substantive defence, in other words, a 
"defence to a crime". It is this defence that the ILC116 referred to when it drafted the 
so-called Nuremberg Principles in 1950, of which Principle III provides as follows: 
Principle III: The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a 
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government 
official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. 
The same principle was inserted in article 27(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides 
that: 
[…] official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government 
or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, [nor shall it, in and 
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
Thus, article 27(1) of the Rome Statute clearly envisages the official status of the 
accused being invoked as a "substantive defence" rather than a "procedural 
defence", which is dealt with in 27(2).117 The reference to "criminal responsibility" in 
article 27(1) bears a striking similarity to the words "defence to a crime" used in the 
Implementation Act and their corresponding use in Snyman and Burchell's works 
referred to above. It thus appears that the wording of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the 
Implementation Act is modelled on article 27(1) of the Rome Statute, which refers to 
the defence of official capacity, not immunity, ratione materiae and ratione 
personae, which is dealt with in a separate provision, ie article 27(2). This article 
(article 27(2)) provides that:  
                                            
114 Kemp et al Criminal Law 101. 
115 Snyman Criminal Law 129. 
116 ILC Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session UN Doc A/1316 
(1950) 375. 
117 Art 27(2) of the Rome Statute reads as follows: "Immunities or special procedural rules which 
may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person". 
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[I]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of 
a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 
The Rome Statute therefore clearly distinguishes between the defence of official 
capacity on the one hand and the defence of immunity (both ratione materiae and 
immunity ratione personae) on the other. It is clear that section 4(2)(a)(i) of the 
Implementation Act was modelled on the first paragraph of article 27, not the 
second. It thus follows that the words "defence to a crime" contained in section 
4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act must be understood as referring to the official 
status of the accused being pleaded as a substantive defence to a crime (the 
defence of "official capacity"), rather than being a bar to the proceedings altogether 
(immunity ratione materiae or ratione personae). This interpretation of section 
4(2)(a)(i) is clearly the only one which can be consistent with a grammatical 
approach to statutory interpretation.  
Dugard118 alludes to the above interpretation, but for reasons that are not correct, 
concludes that section 4(2)(a)(i) removes both functional and personal immunities. 
He says: 
This would seem to mean that a head of state or government will not be able to 
plead immunity in respect of the crimes recognised by the Rome Statute-genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes-unless the word "defence" in s 4(a)(i) is 
interpreted narrowly to apply only to a substantive defence on the merits of the 
case and not to a plea to jurisdiction, which would be an untenable interpretation in 
the light of article 27 of the Rome Statute denying immunity.119 
With respect, Dugard's argument does not hold. The fact that the Rome Statute 
does not recognise any type of immunity before the ICC does not entail the rejection 
of such immunities in domestic courts even when persons are accused of 
international crimes. These are different jurisdictions and different rules apply. As 
stated earlier,120 it is a settled issue in international law that both immunity ratione 
materiae and immunity ratione personae do not apply before international criminal 
                                            
118 Dugard International Law 257. 
119 Dugard International Law 257. 
120 See para 1 above. 
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tribunals. However, as stated before,121 immunity ratione personae (not immunity 
ratione materiae) applies when international crimes are prosecuted in domestic 
courts. As the ICJ stated in the Arrest Warrant case,122 in regard to the immunity 
ratione personae of a foreign minister: 
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule 
according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. 
In the light of the above holding of the ICJ, Dugard's argument that the 
interpretation that section 4(2)(a)(i) does not remove immunity ratione personae 
would be an "untenable interpretation in the light of article 27 of the Rome Statute 
denying immunity" cannot stand. Here, we are dealing with two legal systems: 
article 27 of the Rome Statute governs prosecutions before an international criminal 
tribunal, while section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act governs prosecutions in 
South African courts. On this view, Dugard's argument that section4(2)(a)(i) may not 
be interpreted in a manner that gives it a different meaning from that found in the 
provisions of the Rome Statute is not warranted. 
Dugard's interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) as removing all immunities, in particular 
personal immunity, is also inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution on the 
interpretation of statutes. The Constitution provides that:  
[W]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.123 
Thus, since the Constitution seeks to ensure that South African law will evolve in 
accordance with international law,124 Dugard's argument cannot be accepted.  
                                            
121 See para 2.2.2 above. 
122 Para 58 of the Arrest Warrant case. Also see Dugard International Law 252. 
123 Section 233 Constitution. 
124 Dugard 1997 EJIL 92. Also see Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) 376: "Our 
Constitution reveals a clear determination to ensure that the Constitution and South African law 
are interpreted to comply with international law [...] Firstly, s 233 requires legislation to be 
interpreted in compliance with international law [...]". 
E KAYITANA    PER / PELJ 2015(18)7 
2584 
 
Official statements of the South African government also support the interpretation 
of section 4(2)(a)(i) as not removing the immunity ratione personae of foreign 
officials even when they are accused of international crimes. Subsequent to the 
ICC's arrest warrant against President Bashir125 South Africa's government declared 
that if President Bashir were to visit South Africa, he would be arrested and 
surrendered to the ICC.126 The Government never said that it would arrest Bashir 
and try him in South African courts in accordance with the complementarity regime 
of the Rome Statute. This Government's treatment of Bashir's case thus corroborates 
the present author's interpretation of section (2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act as 
not affecting immunity ratione personae. 
In the light of the above interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation 
Act, it is concluded that this Act is silent on the question of the immunities of foreign 
State officials accused of international crimes before South African courts.127 This 
raises the question as to how South African courts would approach the issue of 
immunity, both functional and personal, should a case arise where such 
(jurisdictional) defences would be pleaded. The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges 
Act128 provides the answer to this question. This Act provides that in addition to 
diplomatic129 and consular130 immunities recognised in the 1961 and 1963 Vienna 
Conventions, foreign heads of State,131special envoys and certain representatives of 
                                            
125 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-3 (4 March 2009). 
126 Sudan Tribune 2010 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35817. 
127 Gevers and Kemp et al interpret the words "defence to a crime" contained in s 4(2)(a)(i) of the 
Implementation Act as referring to immunity ratione materiae. See Gevers 2011 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975788&download=yes 17 and Kemp et al 
Criminal Law 588. This, however, is not correct. As stated above, immunity ratione materiae, just 
as immunity ratione personae, is a procedural defence, not a defence to a crime. It is also worth 
reminding that immunities (both functional and personal) can be waived by the state to which 
the official belongs (see para 2.1 above). This is not applicable to the defence of official capacity 
which belongs to the individual official, not the state.  
128 Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
129 Section 3(1) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
130 Section 3(2) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
131 Section 4(1)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
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foreign States are immune from the criminal (and civil) jurisdiction of the South 
African courts "in accordance with the rules of customary international law".132 
As stated above,133 under customary international law, immunity ratione materiae 
does not apply when a State official (or a former State official) is accused of 
international crimes before the courts of foreign States. With regard to immunity 
ratione personae, however, it was found that, under customary international law this 
immunity applies even when a foreign State official is accused of international 
crimes. In accordance with the provisions of the Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act, therefore, this immunity must be afforded to foreign State officials 
accused of international crimes before South African courts. As to which officials 
qualify for this immunity, customary international law extends it to heads of State, 
heads of government, ministers, diplomats and officials on special missions.134 
3.3 Does immunity ratione personae apply when a foreign State official 
is in South Africa on a private visit? 
Another question that needs particular attention is whether or not immunity ratione 
personae also applies to foreign State officials who might be in South African not on 
official missions but on private visits. The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 
does not contain an express provision on this question. However, this Act seems to 
make a distinction between the immunity of foreign heads of State on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, the immunity of special envoys and other State 
"representatives". In regard to heads of State, the Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act simply provides that they enjoy immunity "in accordance with the rules 
of customary international law".135 With regard to the special envoys and other 
"representatives", however, this Act adds a proviso that their immunities are subject 
to the Minister (of Foreign Affairs)136 making a notice in the Gazette recognising a 
                                            
132 Section 4(2)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
133 See para 2.1 above. 
134 For a detailed discussion on this point see Kayitana Jurisdictional Problems 136-147 and Franey 
Immunity 77-132. 
135 Section 4(1)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
136 Section 1 Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
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special envoy or representative.137 What this means is that special envoys and other 
State representatives enjoy immunity ratione personae before South African courts 
only when their presence has been consented to by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
prior to their arrival by way of notice in the Gazette. In the other words, all foreign 
officials apart from the head of State don't enjoy immunity ratione personae before 
South African courts if they are in the Republic on private visits, because such visits 
may not be the subject of any notice in the Gazette. As for heads of State, the 
question must be answered by reference to customary international law.  
With regard to heads of State, scholars advance two arguments in support of the 
view that customary international law extends immunity ratione personae to them 
even when they are abroad on private visits. Firstly, it is argued that a head of State 
is accorded immunity ratione personae not only because of the functions he 
performs, but also because of what he symbolises: the sovereign State.138 The 
immunity accorded to the head of State is in part due to the respect for the dignity 
of the State which that office represents.139 This idea is echoed in the following 
statement by the House of Lords in the Pinochet case: 
Senator Pinochet is not a serving head of state. If he were, he could not be 
extradited. It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of Chile to arrest him 
or detain him.140 
Secondly, the immunity of heads of State, including when they are abroad on private 
visits, can be justified by the principle of non-intervention, which is the "corollary of 
the principle of sovereign equality of States".141 The principle of the sovereign 
equality of States is enunciated in the UN Charter, where it is provided that the 
"Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members".142 To arrest and detain a head of State is effectively to change the 
                                            
137 Section 4(3) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
138 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 824. 
139 Franey Immunity 59. 
140 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) 1999 2 All 
ER 97. 
141 Nicaragua v United States Military and Para-military Activities in and against Nicaragua 1986 ICJ 
14 (27 June 1986) para 202. 
142 Article 2(1) Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
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government of that State, which would be a gross interference with the autonomy 
and independence of that State and hence a serious infringement of the State's 
sovereignty.143 It thus seems that the immunity ratione personae of foreign heads of 
State is absolute and that it would protect them even when they are in South Africa 
on private visits. The view that the immunity of a head of State extends to private 
visits in foreign States was also endorsed, albeit obiter, by the ICJ in the Arrest 
Warrant case.144 
A question that arises here is whether foreign heads of government should also not 
be granted immunity ratione personae when they are on private visits in South 
Africa. As stated above, the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act only 
distinguishes between the head of State on the one hand, and, on the other, special 
envoys and other State representatives. Thus, for the purposes of immunity ratione 
personae of foreign officials on private visits in South Africa, foreign heads of 
government must be treated according to the rules applicable to special envoys and 
other representatives. This means that they are not accorded immunity when they 
are in South Africa on private visits because, as stated above, such immunity is only 
accorded when the presence of the official in question was consented to by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs by way of notice in the Gazette, prior to their arrival in the 
Republic. 
In the Arrest Warrant case,145 the ICJ took the view that the immunity ratione 
personae of heads of government also extends to their private visits abroad. 
Although the ICJ did not provide any State practice to support its argument, it seems 
that there are good reasons for extending the immunity of heads of government to 
their private visits. Although they may not be considered as having the same 
"majestic dignity" as heads of State, it is the heads of government who in a number 
of States are the effective leaders of their countries.146 In some States, when a head 
of government resigns or is removed from office, the entire government is deemed 
                                            
143 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 823. 
144 Arrest Warrant case para 55. 
145 Arrest Warrant case para 55. 
146 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 824. 
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to have resigned and a new government must be formed.147 To arrest and detain in 
a foreign country a head of government would bring about the same result and 
would thus amount to a change of the government of his or her State, which would 
be an impermissible infringement of that State's sovereignty. Therefore, the 
reasoning of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case148 that heads of government, just 
like heads of State, also enjoy immunity ratione personae on private visits abroad is 
quite apposite. On this view, it is suggested that South Africa should amend the 
Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act to provide that foreign heads of 
government are accorded the same immunity as heads of State, including when they 
are in South Africa on private visits.  
It is submitted, however, that the ICJ's view in the Arrest Warrant case149 that 
ministers of foreign affairs also enjoy immunity ratione personae even when they are 
in foreign countries on private visits is not correct. Ministers, including the minister 
of foreign affairs, may represent the State but do not embody "the supreme 
authority of the State".150 Consequently, their arrest on private visits does not 
significantly offend the dignity of their State and their removal does not signify a 
change in government of the State.151 Thus, the ICJ's view in regard to the immunity 
ratione personae of ministers of foreign affairs seems to be exaggerative. As Cryer152 
notes, there is no state practice, and the ICJ itself did not refer to any, to support 
such a "sweeping rule". In fact, if one draws an analogy from the law and practice of 
diplomatic immunities, one must arrive at the conclusion that foreign ministers 
should not be accorded immunity ratione personae when on holiday or private visit 
in foreign States.153 In the area of diplomatic law personal immunity is not accorded 
to diplomats during holidays in third countries, but only when en poste and during 
                                            
147 Examples of such legal systems include Japan (see for instance the case of Prime Minister 
Yoshihita Noda and his cabinet at NDTV.com 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/japan-s-
cabinet-resigns-to-make-way-for-new-prime-minister-309796), and Holland (see the case of 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte and his cabinet at Preuschat 2012 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303459004577361451277633774.html). 
148 Arrest Warrant case para 55. 
149 Arrest Warrant case para 55. 
150 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 825. 
151 Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 825. 
152 Cryer et al International Criminal Law 548. 
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transit between the home country and the host country.154 There appears to be no 
reason why ministers of foreign affairs, and all ministers in general, should be 
subject to a more favourable regime than diplomats. On this note, it must be 
concluded that the provision of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act that 
denies immunity ratione personae to foreign ministers and other low-ranking officials 
of foreign States who are in South Africa on a private visit does not violate 
international law. In fact, it must also be noted that the extension of full immunity to 
private visits is not consistent with the rationale on which the ICJ founded its 
decision, which was that exposure of a foreign minister to proceedings: 
... could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for 
the purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.155 
This reasoning is inapplicable to private travel.156 Thus, as Yitiha157 says, extending 
the immunity ratione personae of the minister of foreign affairs (and other ministers 
in general) to cover them even when they are abroad on private visits would be 
"erroneous and unjustified". By restricting this immunity to heads of State and heads 
of government, a balance is struck between the requirements of the sovereign 
equality and dignity of States on the one hand and the imperatives of respect for 
human rights on the other.158 
4 Conclusion 
This article has been concerned with the extent to which officials of foreign States 
can be accorded or denied immunity before South African courts when charged with 
international crimes committed in foreign States. Two types of immunities have been 
considered. First, the article has dealt with immunity ratione materiae (or functional 
immunity), which is immunity granted to people for acts performed on behalf of 
States. Secondly, there is immunity ratione personae (or personal immunity) which 
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157 Yitiha Immunity 125. Also see Akande and Shah 2011 EJIL 825. 
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protects certain foreign (in general high ranking) officials because of their status or 
the office they hold.  
With regard to immunity ratione materiae it was found that under customary 
international law this immunity applies only in civil cases, not in criminal cases, in 
particular international crimes.159 Regarding immunity ratione personae it was found 
that, as a matter of customary international law, it still applies even when a State 
official is accused of international crimes.160 
The provisions of the Implementation Act were also considered. Contrary to the 
views advanced by most commentators, this article has argued that the 
Implementation Act does not address the question of the immunity, both ratione 
materiae and ratione personae, of foreign officials accused of international crimes 
before South African courts. This argument has led to the following question: if the 
Implementation Act is silent on the question of the immunities of foreign officials 
accused of international crimes before South African courts, how should these courts 
approach this issue should a case arise where immunity, either ratione materiae or 
ratione personae, is pleaded? It was argued that the answer to this question must 
be found in the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, which provides that the 
representatives of foreign States are immune from the criminal (and civil) jurisdiction 
of the South African courts "in accordance with the rules of customary international 
law".161 
Thus, as this paper has argued,162 since under customary international law immunity 
ratione materiae does not apply when a State official (or a former State official) is 
accused of international crimes before the courts of foreign States, immunity ratione 
materiae may not be a bar to the universal jurisdiction of South African courts when 
trying a case arising from an international crime committed in a foreign State. With 
regard to immunity ratione personae, however, it was stated that under customary 
                                            
159 See para 2.1 above. 
160 See para 2.2.2 above. 
161 Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(2)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
162 See para 2.1 above. 
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international law this immunity applies even when a foreign State official is accused 
of international crimes before the domestic courts of a foreign State.163 In 
accordance with the provisions of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, 
therefore, this immunity must be accorded to foreign State officials accused of 
international crimes before South African courts.164 As to whether this immunity 
should be extended to foreign officials on private visits in South Africa, it was found 
that the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act adopts a restrictive approach 
granting this immunity only to foreign heads of State and denying it to all other 
foreign officials on private visits, including heads of government. On this point, it 
was argued that South African law is not in line with customary international law. It 
was found that, in addition to the head of State, customary international law also 
grants immunity ratione personae to heads of government on private visits in foreign 
countries. Accordingly, it was suggested that the Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act should be amended to extend immunity ratione personae to foreign 
heads of government on private visits in South Africa. 
Ultimately, it is important to emphasise that if section 4(2)(a)(i) of the 
Implementation Act did in fact negate both immunities ratione materiae and ratione 
personae, as suggested by some commentators, South Africa would risk exposing 
itself to proceedings before the ICJ for breaching its international law obligations 
towards other States, just as Belgium did when it circulated an international arrest 
warrant against the minister of foreign affairs of the DRC.165 This is an interpretation 
of the law which clearly should be avoided and which, in fact, is contrary to the spirit 
of the Constitution, which accords high regard to international law.166 
                                            
163 See para 2.2.2 above. In support of this conclusion, also see Cassese International Criminal Law 
12. 
164 See para 3.2 above. 
165 In support of this conclusion, see also Council of the European Union 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/troika_ua_ue_rapport_competence_universe
lle_EN.pdf 42: "Those national criminal justice authorities considering exercising universal 
jurisdiction over persons suspected of serious crimes of international concern are legally bound 
to take into account all the immunities to which foreign state officials may be entitled under 
international law and are consequently obliged to refrain from prosecuting those officials entitled 
to such immunities". 
166 See para 3.2 above.  
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